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I. INTRODUCTION
Although many historical and noteworthy events took place in
1994, the top story of the year was the brutal slaying of O.J. Simpson's
ex-wife Nicole Simpson and her friend Ronald Goldman.' This case
clearly involves more than Simpson's success and his notoriety. "Add
the race angle (Simpson is black, the victims white)"2 and a door opens
on a new set of controversial issues. The American public has fixated
on every detail of this case, including its ever-present racial overtones.
How can a racial focus be avoided? It cannot. "Race always comes into
play . . . we live in a racist society, and people experience different
social worlds as a result of race."3
When the case against Simpson began in June of 1994, some specu-
lation occurred as to whether Simpson would choose to raise the insanity
defense.4 Some aspects of the case, however, cautioned against that
defense: Simpson's "Mr. Clean" image, his flight, and the possibility
that -he could use another defense such as the "sudden quarrel" or the
1. Arlene Levinson, O.J. Outruns Competition, He's Top Story of 1994; Elections are 2nd,
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 1, 1995, at 31A.
2. Id.
3. Nina Burleigh, Preliminary Judgments, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 61 (quoting from
Professor Peter Arenella, UCLA Law School).
4. See Donna Foote et al., Now Comes the Legal Odyssey, NEWSWEEK, June 27, 1994, at 22.
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"heat of passion" to lessen the charge against him. The discussion of
whether O.J. Simpson would plead insanity was one of the rare aspects
of the case that was not analyzed with respect to the impact of race.
Interestingly, despite voluminous data available on race and arrests,
incarceration, and institutionalization, there is little discussion in the
literature and few studies concerning the insanity defense as it relates to
race.
Crime, incarceration and detention in the United States is intimately
connected with race and racism. Studies repeatedly demonstrate that
African-Americans, whether adults or youths, are involuntarily detained
disproportionately more often than whites.' In one study, overall arrest
rates for blacks were four times that of whites, and the arrest rates for
murder, in particular, were ten times that of whites. Additionally,
blacks outnumbered whites in correctional institutions nine to one.'
Juvenile offender statistics are comparable, with approximately four
nonwhite youths arrested for every white youth and an equal incarcera-
tion rate.9
African-Americans also comprise a disproportionate share of indi-
viduals involuntarily held in public mental health institutions. Accord-
ing to one study, the black population in these institutions exceeded the
white population by fifty-two percent.'" The irony of this statistic is that
the success of the insanity defense often turns upon prior contact with
the mental health system. Greater contact with the mental health system
appears, in many instances, to be a prerequisite, or at least a corequisite,
to a successful insanity defense." However, whether or not African-
Americans are involuntarily held in mental institutions does not guaran-
tee that they have the requisite contact with the mental health system to
provide a basis for a successful insanity defense.
Studies of the insanity defense detail those who plead Not Guilty
by Reason of Insanity ("NGRI") as "primarily single, Caucasian, some-
what older and better educated than the usual defendant group, unem-
ployed at the time of the insane offense, and with a history characterized
by chronic unemployment, prior psychiatric treatment, drug abuse, alco-
5. Id.
6. See generally Charles E. Owens, Mental Health and Black Offenders 1-13 (1980).
7. Id. at 6.
8. Mildred S. Cannon & Ben Z. Locke, Being Black is Detrimental to One's Mental Health:
Myth or Reality, 38 PHYLON 408, 410 (1977).
9. Todd W, Martin & Henry J. Grubb, Race Bias in Diagnosis and Treatment of Juvenile
Offenders: Findings and Suggestions, 20 J. CONTEMP. PSYCHOTHERAPY 259, 261 (1990).
10. Cannon & Locke, supra note 8, at 410.
11. See table infra note 84.
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hol abuse, and previous arrests."' 2 Studies describe successful acquit-
tees as "older and better educated . . . more likely to have been
diagnosed as schizophrenic and less likely to have had a history of drug
abuse."' 3 These studies find no difference, however, with respect to
other variables such as ethnicity.' 4 It is difficult to reconcile the finding
that the plea of NGRI is entered primarily by Caucasians with the con-
clusion that there is no racial disparity in groups of successful insanity
acquittees.
Studies of the impact of race upon the mental health and the correc-
tional systems, and studies of the public's attitude toward violence and
race suggest that race has a considerable impact upon all areas of crimi-
nal justice. The conclusion of studies of the insanity defense, that they
are race-neutral, seems curious.
This Comment will examine data on race and the insanity defense
based on an eight-state study."5 Section I explores various studies treat-
ing racial disparities in the mental health and the correctional fields, the
intersection of these fields in the juvenile and adult justice systems, and
how these studies relate to the ethnicity data gathered in various studies
on the insanity defense itself. Section II focuses on the sufficiency of
legal mechanisms to prevent racism or to seek redress for racism in
applying the insanity defense. It explains other possibilities for the use
of empirical studies to assist in the administration of justice. Section III
is a diagnosis of the present system and suggestions for improvement
that would allow a more racially-balanced use of the insanity defense
12. Richard A. Pasewark et al., Differentiating Successful and Unsuccessful Insanity Plea
Defendants in Colorado, J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 54, 55 (1987).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas: An
Eight-State Study, 18 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 331, 331 (1991). This study, funded by
the National Institute of Mental Health, compiles data detailing aspects of the insanity defense
from pleas to acquittals for California, Georgia, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Washington, and Wisconsin. Information in this study dates from 1975 to 1985; this is the most
comprehensive insanity plea study to date.
According to the authors, data on insanity pleas are not centrally located, therefore, case files
had to be examined individually to gather the appropriate information. Id. The acquittal data,
however, are maintained by the individual mental health facilities where the offenders are placed
for treatment. Id. The individual researchers completed a data abstract form which was compiled
into the finished statistics. Some of the results of the study are presented in this paper.
The study identified those who entered the insanity plea at any point in their defense and
followed the disposition of their case, whether acquitted by not guilty by reason of insanity
(NGRI) or found guilty. Id. at 332. Any subsequent information as to post-acquittal treatment or
entry into the prison system was gathered directly from the post-acquittal hospital facilities
themselves or from the state officials for the prison systems. Id. at 333.
1 These data are analyzed for the first time in this paper thanks to the invaluable assistance of
Henry J. Steadman, Ph.D., and the diligence and patience of Eric Silver of Policy Research
Associates, Inc.
1995]
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from a systemic perspective. This section questions the possibility of
treating and neutralizing racism within the criminal justice system.
Finally, Section IV integrates data on race and the suggestions of some
practitioners.
II. WHAT DOES RESEARCH INDICATE?
Interestingly, over ninety percent of criminal defendants actually
plead guilty. 16 This means that less than ten percent of all defendants
plead not guilty. Less than one percent of all "not guilty" pleas in the
criminal justice system are insanity pleas. 17 Of those asserting the
insanity defense, only twenty-six percent are actually acquitted as
NGRI.I8 This translates to a minute segment of the criminal population;
only .02% of all defendants who plead not guilty are acquitted NGRI.
Yet, there is comparatively a large body of research dedicated to the
insanity defense. Furthermore, the defense itself has aroused the public
to the point of lobbying for legislative enactments and insanity defense
"reforms ...designed primarily to 'narrow the window' for insanity
defense proceedings by making the laws governing insanity pleas more
restrictive."' 9 Because the insanity defense is neither frequently utilized
nor successful in many cases, the examination of racial factors in con-
junction with the insanity defense raises diverse issues concerning how
our legal system and our culture perceive the defense.
A. Population Case Studies
According to Alfred Blumstein:
One of the most distressing and troublesome aspects of the oper-
ation of the criminal justice system in the United States is the severe
disproportionality between blacks and whites in the comparison of
prison populations . . . . Although blacks comprise roughly one-
eighth of the population, they represent about one-half of the prison
16. Steven K. Hoge et al., Attorney-Client Decision-Making in Criminal Cases; Client
Competence and Participation as Perceived by Their Attorneys, 10 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 385, 386
(1992). The actual number of "not guilty" pleas is rather low; guilty pleas comprise a greater
percentage of the total pleas in both the state and federal criminal justice systems. According to
Hoge:
Guilty pleas outnumber trials by more than 5 to I at the Federal level and by about
10 to 1 at the state and local level.... Given the high crime rates and the enormous
volume of cases that urban courts must contend with, the only way to dispense
justice at all, it is argued, is by inducing the mass of defendants to plead guilty in
return for a promise of leniency.
Id.; see also Barbara Boland & Brian Forst, Prosecutors Don't Always Aim to Pleas, 49 FED.
PROBATION 10, 10 (1985).
17. See Callahan et al., supra note 15, at 335.
18. Id.
19. HENRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY 14 (1993).
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population.20
Blumstein further explains that black males in their twenties are the
most highly imprisoned group of people in the population; they are
imprisoned at a rate that is at least twenty-five times that of the total
population.21 He compares this to the actual likelihood of imprisonment
of the total population and concludes that a great disparity exists
between incarceration rates of whites and blacks.22 He argues that dis-
crimination is not found in the disparity of imprisonment rates between
men and women in the total prison population-ninety-six percent ver-
sus four percent-because men commit crimes more often and of a
more serious nature than do women. 3
Racial differences in arrest rates may thus actually account for
many of the differences in incarceration rates. In addition, this initial
discrimination may serve as a mask for discrimination at a later stage of
the process. 24 If blacks were arrested more often than whites, any subse-
quent step in the criminal justice system would still lead to a dispropor-
tionate outcome. Because there is no exact test for discrimination within
the criminal justice system, examining the arrest patterns and eventual
convictions may indicate the areas where underlying discrimination is
present. For instance, Blumstein notes that police patrols are more often
present in "poorer, more crowded and more crime-prone neighborhoods
.... This difference in patrol intensity could account for some of the
disproportionality in black arrest rates."'25 Blumstein further asserts that
the types of crimes for which most African-Americans are arrested, such
as homicide and robbery, are those which most likely carry prison
terms.26 If the crimes with which whites are associated, such as fraud or
corporate crimes, were more heavily pursued, the disparity would
lessen.27
The actors in the criminal justice system can be seen as playing a
particular role in deciding the fate of a defendant based upon race.
"[D]ifferential treatment might also be associated with the degree to
which prosecutors or judges might attempt to predict an offender's
recidivism on the basis of his education or other socioeconomic factors
that are often associated with an offender's ability to function effectively
20. Alfred Blumstein, On the Racial Disproportionality of United States' Prison Populations,
73 J. CGRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1259, 1259 (1982).
21. Id. at 1260.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1262.
24. Martin & Grubb, supra note 9, at 263, 268.
25. Blumstein, supra note 20, at 1277.
26. Id. at 1279.
27. Id.
19951
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within the legitimate economy. However, according to Blumstein,
the potential for changing discriminatory practices is more likely to
occur for lesser offenses than for those that are punishable by capital
punishment because of the emphasis placed on a defendant's prior rec-
ord, which may have been elongated due to some type of racial bias in
decisionmaking. 29 Aggregation of the criminal processing stages served
as an integral part of the research discussed in Blumstein's article. Thus,
discrimination is seen at the final stage of incarceration, rather than as a
discrete set of steps leading to imprisonment. 30 This final-step study,
however, does not show the point at which discriminatory influences
most often enter the defendant's trek through the legal system.
The legal system operates on the basis of objectively verifiable evi-
dence, and, therefore, often clashes with the more subjective mental
health system that is premised in the behavior of its clients.3 1 In other
words, law looks to an achievable truth as the basis of the adversarial
system, while mental health focuses on the unconscious processes, anxi-
eties and defenses as the cause of human behavior.32 These systems do
not always use similar methods in the treatment of those that come
before them. One aspect that both systems have in common, however, is
the need to maintain the perception that they are free of bias,33 although
one commentator has said that the phrase "neutral expert" is an
oxymoron.34
To understand the impact that the expert psychologist or psychia-
trist has upon the insanity defense, it is necessary to examine literature
that gives insight into the differential treatment of defendants in the cor-
rectional and the mental health fields. Two articles in particular, one
focusing on the racial bias in the diagnosis and treatment of juvenile
offenders, 35 and the other focusing on involuntary commitment,36 shed
light on the disparate treatment of the races within the juvenile justice
and mental health systems.
The first article provides an overview of research regarding the
28. Id. at 1270.
29. Id. at 1276.
30. Id. at 1280.
31. Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary
Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 131 (1991).
32. Id.
33. Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U.
MIAMI L. Rv. 625, 640 (1993).
34. Id. at 641.
35. See Martin & Grubb, supra note 9.
36. See Kenneth Lindsey & Gordon Paul, Involuntary Commitments to Public Mental
Institutions: Issues Involving the Overrepresentation of Blacks and Assessment of Relevant
Functioning, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 171 (1989).
[Vol. 50:209
RACISM IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE
treatment of African-American juvenile offenders.37 The authors focus
on cultural differences as an important ingredient of racism in diagnosis.
The article historically details the treatment and perception of African-
Americans by the mental health system and the manner in which race
determines the approach the therapist takes in evaluating the African-
American patient.38 According to the study: "The major-culture in this
nation upholds the primacy of the individual. . . . The Black cultural
perspective concerning the place of the member in his group is quite
different. The member is understood to be secondary to the group."39
In this culturally-disparate framework, white middle-class evalu-
ators see white juvenile offenders as having a psychological problem if
they exhibit certain behaviors, while they categorize black offenders as
exhibiting behavior characteristic of their culture. Therefore, African-
Americans do not receive the treatment that they require while being
funnelled through the criminal justice system.4° Some of the conclu-
sions based upon mistaken cultural perceptions and detailed in various
studies are summarized below.
According to one article, "black people are less often accepted for
therapy, are more often assigned to inexperienced therapists, are seen for
shorter periods of time."41 Similarly, when dealing with parents of chil-
dren in need of therapy, these same therapists tend to give less advice to
black parents.42 African-Americans, who often do not verbalize during
therapy sessions, view the treatment and testing atmosphere as very sti-
fling.43 When therapists receive limited verbal responses or otherwise
do not receive the sought after responses to questions, they use less pro-
jective tests that do not require verbalization." These types of racially
imbalanced encounters with the mental health system stem from thera-
pist biases that, as most therapists are white, "are brought about by a
lack of experience with the Black culture earlier in the clinician's
training. '4
5
As a result of cross-cultural misunderstandings, "a disproportionate
number of Black youth are treated more harshly for equivalent offenses
to which their white cohorts are either released from or unofficially
37. Martin & Grubb, supra note 9, at 261.
38. Id. at 262-63.
39. Id. at 265. The African-American patient's strong association with the group often
shadows the independence that is looked for in the Eurocentric therapist.
40. Id. at 259.
41. Id. at 262.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 263. Patients who do verbalize during testing sessions are seen as deviating from
the anticipated behavior.
44. Id. at 263.
45. Id. at 262.
1995]
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treated through the mental health system."46 Not surprisingly, the article
notes, for African-Americans to become successful in the majority sys-
tem they must do so at the "expense of their own cultural identity.
47
Cultural identity appears to lead to this disparate diagnoses. An under-
standing of those perceptions that influence the evaluator is essential to
the determination of the mental health condition of an offender and to
the subsequent decision whether to utilize the insanity defense.
Involuntarily committed African-Americans are overrepresented in
public mental health institutions.48  "[T]hey are even more over-
represented among acute admissions ... and tend to be assigned more
severe diagnostic categories."4 9 Frequently, misdiagnosis of black
patients occurs with respect to schizophrenia.50 As a result, these
patients receive higher doses of medication than necessary.51 One
hypothesis regarding the higher commitment rates is that vague commit-
ment laws allow biased decisionmakers to discriminate against African-
Americans. 2 This type of cultural misinterpretation is much like that
encountered in juvenile offender studies. Often, commitment laws are
not well defined and permit discretionary and biased predictions of
future behavior to determine commitment.5 3 Culturally appropriate
behaviors may thus be perceived through a biased eye as a mental disor-
der, which, in turn, may lead to commitment.14 In addition, the study
points to commitment criteria that are not properly defined in many
instances so that accurate determination of future behavior is not possi-
ble, and may even promote decisionmaking in a stereotypical fashion.5
In some cases, black patients are brought to a mental health facility
at a "more deteriorated state of functioning,"56 perhaps because they
tend to avoid institutionalization and maintain the members of their
community until those individuals can no longer function within soci-
ety.57 However, these socially-oriented aspects of African-American
culture are not reflected in a common diagnostic session based upon "the
predominant normative interpretations of typically White, middle-class
46. Id. at 269.
47. Id. at 259-60.
48. See Lindsey & Paul, supra note 36, at 171.
49. Id. at 172.
50. Susan Stefan, Issues Relating to Women and Ethnic Minorities in Mental Health
Treatment and Law, in THE LAW'S IMPACT ON MENTAL HEALTH (Bruce D. Sales & Daniel W.
Shuman eds., forthcoming 1996) (manuscript on file with the author).
51. Id.




56. Id. at 173.
57. Id.
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mental health professionals.""8 This understanding of African-American
cultural protectiveness may still allow a therapist to understand why
treatment was not administered at an earlier stage.
Studies have shown that therapists generally appear to prefer
and are more comfortable with middle- and upper-class clients, that
is, clients who are more similar to themselves .... Psychologists
tend to blame the lower-class clients for failure to make therapeutic
gains and to ascribe more negative traits to this population .... Most
studies suggest that black clients tend to remain in therapy for shorter
periods (than white clients).59
A subjective commitment standard, coupled with the inherent biases and
prejudices of the evaluator, create a barrier to fair treatment for African-
Americans in the mental health system.
Cultural biases in diagnoses will inevitably affect the insanity
defense because the insanity defense often hinges on the strength of
diagnostic testimony.6" Moreover, the variable of a jury trial must also
be considered. Research shows that jurors often share the same biases
as therapists and administrators:
There is some empirical evidence which suggests that instruc-
tions and expert testimony in an insanity defense case may have
lesser weight than was heretofore imagined .... Jurors may often
disregard or reconstrue both the expert testimony and the instructions
to the jury, choosing instead to follow their own, intuitive under-
standing or common sense notion of what is and is not insane.61
According to one author, mock jury studies are usually the best indicia
of racial biases for the determination of guilt because all variables may
be controlled;62 these mock studies support the theory that there is racial
bias in guilt determinations.63
A recent study involved reading transcripts of four crimes. White
subjects were used and the race of the defendant was varied. This study
concluded:
After reading otherwise identical transcripts, white subjects rated the
58. Id.
59. OWENS, supra note 6, at 78.
60. Michael Perlin notes that variables such as "race, sex, culture, gender preference, physical
attractiveness and economic status significantly affect expert testimony." Perlin, supra note 33, at
642.
61. Norman J. Finkel et al., Insanity Defenses: From the Jurors' Perspective, 9 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REv. 77, 79 (1982).
62. Sheri L. Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1611 (1985).
63. Id. at 1625. The mock jury studies are conducted either by giving a transcript or
videotape of the trial to study participants, or by the researcher reading a summary of the trial. In
these types of studies, "[b]ecause the only factor that has been varied is a participant's race,
statistically significant differences can be interpreted as reflecting a causal relationship between
race and guilt attribution." Id. at 1625-26.
1995)
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
probability that the white defendant had raped the black victim at
33%, but rated the probability of the black defendant's guilt of that
crime at 52%; they also rated the probability that the white defendant
had burglarized the white victim at 52% but the probability of the
black defendant's guilt at 63%. 64
A biased jury is thus a great concern to the black defendant.
Indeed, thirty years of research documents the discrimination that
underlies the general attitudes of mental health professionals and the
criminal justice system. Many researchers have also studied the insanity
defense itself. This focus is surprising, considering that a regional study
of the United States indicates that "5,424 NGRI patients [were] served
as inpatients in the United States on one day in 1986. Adjusted to popu-
lation figures, this is a rate of 2.2 per 100,000 people,"65 not a large
number by any means.
Nonetheless, a dearth of information exists on the impact of race on
the insanity defense. This appears to be attributable to explanations that
the figures between the races were not statistically significant or not
present because of the small pool of nonwhite defendants.66 Under-
standably, this makes it more difficult to determine a racially-based
breakdown. For example, one study in Colorado showed that the per-
centages of caucasian to African-American defendants were eighty per-
cent to six percent, respectively. 67 Other studies of the insanity defense
make little or no reference to race.68
Conversely, a study conducted in 1976 found that race might have a
significant effect on the outcome of an insanity plea.69 In a hypothetical
murder case with defendants of both races, white college students
granted a verdict of NGRI less frequently to blacks than to whites.7 °
"[B]lack males were held more criminally responsible for their maladap-
64. Id. at 1630 (quoting Kitty Klein & Blanche Creech, Race, Rape and Bias: Distortion of
Prior Odds and Meaning Changes, 3 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 21, 24 (1982)).
65. Bruce B. Way et al., Forensic Psychiatric Inpatients Served in the United States:
Regional and System Differences, 19 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 405, 411 (1991).
66. Pasewark et al., supra note 12, at 69-70.
67. Id. at 58.
68. See generally Jeffrey Janofsky et al., Defendants Pleading Insanity: An Analysis of
Outcome, 17 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 203 (1989); Hugh McGinley & Richard A.
Pasewark, National Survey of the Frequency and Success of the Insanity Plea and Alternate Pleas,
17 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 205 (1989). This study mentions that "[o]ther demographic factors such
as age, number of dependents, educational level, severity of illness, and criminal background did
not discriminate between (those found NGRI and those found guilty]. Janofsky, supra, at 203.
Again the researchers found that "race ... did not differentiate between the groups." Id. at 207.
69. Richard P. McGlynn et al., Sex and Race as Factors Affecting the Attribution of Insanity
in a Murder Trial, 93 J. PSYCHOL. 93, 97 (1976).
70. OWENS, supra note 6, at 25-26.
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tive behavior than any of the other groups, 7I even though the actual case
description was the same except for race and sex."'72 This study is one
of the few that examines race as an integral aspect in the determination
of criminal responsibility.
B. Analysis and Changes in State Law
The Callahan study, which formed the basis for the book Before
and After Hinckley,73 details many current statistics concerning the
insanity defense, including plea and acquittal data for eight states.74 One
aspect of the study that the book does not cover in depth is the ethnic
breakdown of plea and acquittal data. This information is vital to any
examination of racism in the insanity defense.
The authors studied 8,979 insanity pleas entered in eight states
from 1976 to 1987. 75 Although the years and numbers of defendants
studied varied slightly by state, 2,555 defendants were acquitted. 76
Whites comprised approximately 44% of the total number of insanity
pleas and blacks, approximately 40%.7 7 The results are statistically sig-
nificant and demonstrate racial differences in the success of the insanity
defense.
To illustrate, of the 3,325 total white defendants in the study who
pled NGRI, 2,259 or 67.9% were found guilty and 1,066 or 32.1% were
acquitted NGRI. 78 Black defendants had a slightly more skewed out-
71. White males, white females and black females made up the other groups.
72. OWENS, supra note 6, at 26.
73. STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 5-10; see also Callahan et al., supra note 15, at 331.
74. See Callahan et al., supra note 15, at 331. The 8,979 insanity pleas found in this study
came from an examination of over one million files. Id. at 333. Generally, the higher the plea rate
in a state, the lower the acquittal rate for NGRIs. Id. at 334. The successful NGRIs in this study
were older, female, better educated, and single, with a mean age of 30.3 years for insanity pleas
and 32.1 for insanity acquittals. Id. at 335. However, the author did not mention racial factors in
this characterization. Usually, acquittals in these cases occurred before a judge, not a jury. In
addition, acquittees were more likely to have had a prior mental health facility hospitalization
record. Id. at 336. Finally, the researchers found that 15% of the insanity acquittees never pled
NGRI in the first place. Id. at 335.
75. This total stemmed from an attempt by the researchers to achieve an examination of at
least two-thirds of the insanity acquittals in each of the eight states studied. See STEADMAN ET
AL., supra note 19, at 21. To find the requisite number of insanity defense cases, researchers
examined close to one million indictments in the eight states. See Callahan et al., supra note 15,
at 333.
76. Callahan et al., supra note 15, at 336.
77. Id. at 336. Researchers categorized another 455 defendants as "other minority." They did
not designate the remaining 1,034 defendants. Raw data from Policy Research Associates showed
a smaller comparison base with a total of 3,000 African-American defendants and 3,325 white
defendants. The author obtained this data from, and uses it with the permission of, Henry J.
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come. From the 3,000 black defendants, 2,107 or 70.2% were found
guilty, and 893 or 29.8% were found NGRI.79 A comparison of both
data sets show a lower success rate for blacks as a group. Researchers
have found this data statistically significant (p <.05).
Data on prior mental health system contact and treatment for
acquittees also shows the varying levels of success in the insanity
defense which differentiates with regard to race.8 0 Most acquittees of
both races, 82.5% of the total, had at least one prior experience with the
mental health system.8' Whites had more prior contact with the mental
health system, and blacks needed more contact for acquittal.8 2 The pop-
ulation of white acquittees with no prior mental health treatment was
18.2%, compared to 14.9% for black acquittees. White acquittees who
had previous contact with the mental health system comprised 81.8% of
the total; and 85.1% of black acquittees had at least one mental health
experience. 3 Researchers found this data statistically significant with
respect to prior contact with the mental health system (p <.05).84
An understanding of two issues helps explain the plea data and the
significant results: First, which defendants plead NGRI and why? Sec-
ond, who are these successful acquittees and what role does the mental
health professional play in this determination? Defendants charged with
felonies, such as homicide, more commonly raise the insanity defense. 5
Theoretically, a defendant may assert a plea of NGRI "when the act was
committed with a state of mind (related to mental disorder) that renders
the individual blameless. 8 6 Studies do not indicate that the defendant
79. Id.
80. See table infra note 84.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. Ohio, New York, and Wisconsin held blacks to a much stricter scrutiny than whites
for prior mental health contact. In Wisconsin, for example, 20.0% of white acquittees had no
prior contact with the mental health system, and 80.0% had at least one. In Wisconsin, 4.6% of
black acquittees had no experience with the mental health system, and 95.4% had at least one
visit.
84. See discussion supra note 77.
Acquittees and Prior Mental Health System Contact
Race Mental Health Contact Total % Significance
White None 162 18.2 .000
At Least One 726 81.8 .000
Black None 108 14.9 .000
At Least One 617 85.1 .000
These data were statistically significant at the p <.05 level and demonstrated that African-
Americans must, on average, show more mental health contact than their white counterparts in
order to be found NGRI.
85. SEYMOUR HALLECK, THE MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFEaDER 47 (1986).
86. THOMAS GRIsso, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND
INsTRUMENTs 156 (1993). Blamelessness is often difficult for the public to accept for anyone
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must have had prior contact with the criminal justice system.8 7 Defend-
ants who plead insanity often "do not fit [the] usual stereotype of
criminals, such as police officers who commit violent crimes or mothers
who attempt to murder their children.""8 These uncommon defendants
often use the defense successfully. Generally, successful insanity
acquittees are "predominantly white, single males who are unskilled or
semiskilled workers in the age range of 25 to 35, with previous psychiat-
ric hospitalization having occurred in less than half the cases." 9 John
Hinckley is a prime example of this categorically successful defendant.90
Of course, a defendant who intends to use the defense must first be eval-
uated by a mental health professional.
Psychologists and psychiatrists who test potential NGRI defendants
contribute diagnoses that foster this racially-imbalanced outcome of
insanity acquittals. According to one author: "There are two general
conclusions that can be made about the research on black offenders.
First of all, black behavior and responses are evaluated by white stan-
dards." 91  This white "normalcy" standard finds African-Americans
inadequate in almost every consideration.92 Second, "the mental health
professional community has not accumulated a knowledge base on black
offender behavior that can be used reliably by its membership to guide
its interaction with black offenders. [T]he treatment of blacks has been
simply tailored to the perceived socioeconomic and cultural realities of
the day."' 9 3 This quote echoes the sentiments of many authors of racial
comparison studies: The races are not treated the same.
A comparison of these two racial groups shows that whites com-
prised 49.1% of those found guilty and 50.6% of those found NGRI,
while blacks comprised 45.8% and 42.4%, respectively.94 Although this
committing a criminal act. This is demonstrated by the outcry provoked by John Hinckley's
insanity acquittal in 1982.
87. Prior contact with the mental health system does, however, appear to correlate with a
successful insanity defense. See table supra note 84.
88. See HALLECK, supra note 85, at 47.
89. Gfasso, supra note 86, at 156.
90. John Hinckley attempted to assassinate former President of the United States, Ronald
Reagan, in April 1981.
91. OWENS, supra note 6, at 16.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 16-17.
94. According to the data for those found guilty of both races, the percentages 49.1% and
45.8% do not total 100% because there are other categories such as Hispanic, Asian, Native
American, and Other which comprise a relatively small percentage of defendants.
According to Steadman, in Before and After Hinckley, "[t]he sociodemographic
characteristics of insanity acquittees [are] to be quite similar to those of the larger cohort of
convicted felons. Insanity acquittals tend to be somewhat older and were more likely to be
members of a racial minority than the larger cohort of convicted felons." STEADMAN ET AL., supra
note 19, at 29. This statement comes close to claiming that insanity acquittees echo the arrested
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disparity may not appear large, because of quantitatively fewer African-
American than white defendants in the study, the relative percentage is
larger for white defendants who were acquitted NGRI than for African-
Americans.
Each of eight states in the study demonstrate a different rate of
insanity pleas and acquittals in their populations. According to calcula-
tions from the raw data, California, New Jersey, Washington and Wis-
consin show higher intraracial acquittal rates for white defendants than
African-American defendants. 96 These results imply a greater disparity
in percentages within each race, although the data have not been found
to be statistically significant. Researchers indicate that they included
New Jersey, Washington, and Wisconsin in the study as comparison
states because these states had not altered their insanity defense statutes
from 1979 to 1984.97 Thus, these states provide a clearer picture of the
population. This finding, however, accounted for four of the study states:
Montana, and New York. See supra note 77.
95. See STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 19.
96. See discussion supra note 77.
























































Although these figures are not statistically significant, (p >.05) a pattern emerges in which whites
are more likely to be found NGRI than African-Americans. Georgia, Montana, Ohio and New
York provide opposite results: higher acquittal rates for black defendants than for white
defendants.














































*Ohio was the only state found to have statistically significant results.
Unfortunately, neither the study nor the book outlines any further details about
Ohio.
97. Callahan et al., supra note 15, at 332.
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effects of race on the insanity defense for that time period.
The book, Before and After Hinckley,98 provides a thorough discus-
sion of the effects in California, a state which changed some of its
insanity defense laws. Of the total study population of 547 white
defendants in California, 49.5% or 271 were found guilty and 50.5% or
276 were found NGRI.99 Of the total black population of 327 included
in the study, 51.4% or 168 were found guilty and 48.6% or 159 were
acquitted as NGRI. 10 Although these figures were not statistically sig-
nificant, California serves as an example for state legislative change.
In response to Hinckley's acquittal, California changed its insanity
test from the American Law Institute (ALI) test to the McNaughtan test.
This change represents an attempt to restrict the use of the insanity
defense. 0 1 Although California felony indictments climbed steadily
from 1979 to 1984, insanity pleas reached a low of 57 in 1984 from a
high of 173 in 1980.102 The change in the insanity test was not the only
factor that decreased the number of insanity pleas. Changes in legisla-
tion, such as stricter sentencing guidelines, also reduced the number of
insanity pleas.'0 3
The success rate of the insanity plea in California dropped sharply
from 52% to 38% between early 1981 and the second half of 1982.1°4
Although the study suggests that the success rate was not necessarily
attributable to the insanity test reforms of 1982, interestingly, the
98. STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 45-62.
99. See table supra note 96.
100. STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 45-62.
101. Id. at 45.
The McNaughtan test or "right-wrong" test states that:
[A] person is not criminally responsible if, "at the time of the committing of the act,
the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he/she was doing; or if he/she
did know it, that he/she did not know he/she was doing what was wrong."
Id. at 46 (citation omitted).
The ALl test, which was replaced by the McNaughtan standard, claimed that:
"[A] person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as
a result of mental disease or defect he/she lacks substantial capacity either to appre-
ciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his/her conduct or to conform his/her con-
duct to the requirements of the law."
Id. at 46 (citation omitted).
102. Id. at 50.
103. Id. at 52-53. The other sweeping change in California at that time was a program of
determinate commitment. In response to a 1978 California Supreme Court case, In re Moye, 22
Cal. 3d 457 (1978), which ruled that insanity acquittees could not be held indefinitely, laws were
passed calling for a maximum term for NGRI acquittees "equal[ing] the longest term of
imprisonment that could have been imposed for the offense disregarding any 'good-time' credit
applicable to those convicted." Id. at 52. The authors note further that this often caused longer
sentences for NGRI defendants than if they had been found guilty. Id.
104. Id. at 53.
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insanity plea success was at its lowest after the reforms went into
effect. 1 5  In addition, the study advises that the characteristics of
defendants who pled insanity did not change greatly during the study
period from 1979 to 1984. "Defendants entering the insanity plea were
in their early 30s, male (91%), and diagnosed with a major mental ill-
ness (69%) .... Approximately half (46%) of those raising the insanity
defense were nonwhite."'
' 0 6
The researchers found that the acquittal group was similar in com-
position to the plea group. Approximately two-thirds of the plea group
was involved in violent crimes such as rape or murder and almost three-
quarters of those acquitted were charged with violent crimes. 10 7 Violent
crime involvement, therefore, appeared to be an important indicator of
success of the plea. Insanity acquittees were confined for longer periods
than their counterparts who pled insanity whether they were found guilty
for violent or nonviolent offenses. Over 95% of those acquitted were
hospitalized and the severity of the crime primarily determined the con-
finement period. 10
8
C. Standards and Burdens of Proof
During the Hinckley trial in 1982, the government had the burden
of proving Hinckley sane "beyond a reasonable doubt." The major criti-
cism of this burden is that it is almost impossible to prove "beyond a
reasonable doubt" that anyone is sane. 10 9 This has been a source of con-
stant concern for scholars; the common law demands the state to prove
that the act was committed, and that the defendant possessed the mens
rea, or legal state of mind. Yet, the prosecution has no burden to prove
the defendant's sanity. lO Changing the burden of proof for insanity left
the burden of proving the elements of the crime with the state, but
shifted the burden of proving insanity to the defendant.
The constitutionality of this burden-switching was affirmed in the
United States Supreme Court case of Leland v. Oregon."' However,
"[s]hifting the burden to the defendant may make acquittal much more
105. Id.
106. Id. at 56. "Nonwhite" includes black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American and "Other
Defendants."
107. Id.
108. Id. at 58. The more serious the crime, such as murder or other violent offenses, the longer
the NGRI acquittees stayed in the mental health institution. For example, "[o]ver 50% of NGRI
acquittees charged with murder were still hospitalized 6 years (2,196 days) after they were
admitted to the hospital." Id. As few as 5% of acquittees were not confined or released as
outpatients for treatment. Id.
109. Id. at 64.
110. Id.
111. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
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difficult for the defense, as they must now establish insanity by either a
preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence."" 12
However, one problem with shifting the burden of proof from the state is
the defense's resulting heavier burden of establishing insanity. As will
be discussed, many African-American defendants rely upon public
defenders who maintain large caseloads and lack the time and funds to
pursue an elaborate defense. As a result, an insanity plea may not be an
option, even for those who are legitimately mentally ill.
113
During the era of the study, both Georgia and New York changed
their burdens of proof. These changes were fundamentally equivalent.
"The burden was shifted from the prosecution to the defense and the
standard of insanity was lowered from 'beyond reasonable doubt' to 'by
a preponderance of the evidence.' "114 During the study period from
1982 to 1987, the numbers of insanity pleas and acquittals fell after the
reforms were implemented. 15 "For example, [in New York] out of the
21,730 felony indictments in the first 10 months of 1987 . .. only 18
cases (0.08%) . . . involved an insanity defense.""' 6
An interesting change after the reforms in New York was the
higher success rate; researchers believe that the reform worked to the
extent that those who plead insanity post-reform are those who are most
likely to succeed. 117 In both New York and Georgia, NGRI acquittal
rates were consistently higher for those with major mental illnesses and
those who committed violent offenses." 8 In Georgia, however, only 5%
of insanity acquittals were determined by jury trial. 19 The reform did
not determine confinement, and the data were difficult to analyze
because there were so few subjects in this area.' 20 However, some
important changes did take place, as will be discussed in Section 111.121
The demographics of those who pled insanity and who were acquit-
ted did not change during the period of these reforms. In both Georgia
as New York, about 60% of those asserting the insanity defense were
112. STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 65.
113. Id.; see OWENS, supra note 6, at 76.
114. STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 66. Georgia changed its standard in January of 1978
and New York in November of 1984. Id. at 63.
115. Id. 68-69. According to the study, Georgia's change in its standard reduced the number
of insanity pleas, yet the success rates remained constant. Id.
116. Id. at 76.
117. Id. at 77.
118. Id. at 83.
119. Id. at 81.
120. Id. at 82-83.
121. For example, one important change that surfaced was the number of acquittees diagnosed
with a major mental illness. After the law changed, almost 90% of acquittees had some type of
major mental illness compared to 60% prior to the reform. Id. at 70.
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nonwhite, and this figure had steadily increased over time.'22 The study
finds that "most cases in which the defendant pleaded insanity were
resolved by plea bargains (60%) both before and after the burden and
standard reform."'23 This aspect of the insanity defense process is
extremely significant, and raises an important question: Were the suc-
cessful black defendants tried by a judge or a jury, or did they plea-
bargain? There is no indication of this in the data.
D. Guilty But Mentally Ill
In contrast to the laws in New York, Georgia implemented the
"guilty but mentally ill" ("GBMI") verdict in 1982.124 "Defendants
found GBMI are sentenced as if they had been found guilty, and mental
health treatment is provided within available resources of the Depart-
ment of Corrections."' 125 Thus, "those who were found GBMI received
longer sentences and had longer confinements than 'sane' defendants
found guilty of similar charges." 26 Those who support GBMI reforms
claim that it will lessen the number of insanity acquittals and increase
the number incarcerated, yet there has been little impact on the insanity
defense itself with the GBMI verdict.'
27
Georgia adopted the GBMI verdict in 1983 after the U.S. District
Court case of Benham v. Edwards, 28 in which the court found Georgia's
procedures of committing all defendants acquitted NGRI and its strict
release policies unconstitutional. 29 At the same time, Georgia adopted
the GBMI verdict. 30 Following the adoption of this verdict, a slight
increase in pleas occurred during 1984, although it eventually decreased.
The study found that frequently an insanity plea would be raised, then it
would be bargained down to a GBMI plea; 75% of the GBMI's who had
pleaded insanity were disposed of by a plea bargain, with 19% adjudi-
cated by a judge and 6% by a jury.' 3' The GBMI verdict did not appear
to affect the decline in plea rates, yet the data clearly show that the
122. Id. at 71, 80.
123. Id. at 71.
124. Id. at 102.
125. Id. at 102.
126. Id. at 8. In contrast, "over the last two decades there has been a more rapid release of
NGRI cases from hospitals in many states." Id. at 4.
127. Id. at 103.
128. 501 F. Supp. 1050 (N.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 678 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. granted and vacated sub nom. Ledbetter v. Benham, 463 U.S. 1222 (1983) (for
reconsideration in light of Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983)), aff'd, 785 F.2d 1480
(lIth Cir. 1986).
129. The lower court's decision was ultimately overturned. Benham v. Ledbetter, 463 U.S.
1222 (1983).
130. STEADMAN ET A., supra note 19, at 105.
131. Id. at 107.
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Benham decision and Georgia's adoption of the GBMI verdict reduced
the number of defendants acquitted NGRI.'32
"Prior to the reform, someone pleading insanity for a violent crime
had better than a 1 in 4 chance of being acquitted; after the reform his or
her chances dropped to 1 in 7. " 133 Successful defendants are most likely
to fit the following profile: "male, white, and to have committed a
[more] violent offense than those found either guilty or NGRI."'134 One
statistic, however, is clear from the study: defendants who were charged
with murder and suffered from a major mental illness were more likely
to be found GBMI (1 out of 4), than NGRI (1 out of 15).
135
In many states, the GBMI verdict is a compromise piece of legisla-
tion, often used to assuage society, including members of the jury, who
may feel that crime should not go unpunished, whatever the source.
13 6
The GMBI verdict is also an apt vehicle for discrimination, as there is a
sense of morality obtainable for the jury. Even if a defendant is found to
have a mental incapacity, he can be detained for his entire sentence. The
public may be more receptive to this verdict because there is an adjudi-
cation of guilt and a foreseeable punishment. At the same time, the
defendant is sentenced to a mental health facility for treatment before
being sent to prison. These convicted parties will not be subject to
release on the same terms as a NGRI acquittee. Under this morality test
defendants are subject to the covert biases and prejudices of the individ-
ual jurors who will decide their fate. Often, if there is a manner in
which to keep defendants in prison, rather than allow them to go free on
the streets, this will be a major consideration for the jury.
E. Abolishing the Insanity Defense and Reconciling the Results
Some of the results from the above data may be misleading. For
example, Montana had only four insanity pleas during the study years
and, since 1979, abolished its insanity defense. 137 "[T]he Act to Abolish
the Defense of Mental Disease or Defect in Criminal Actions and to
Provide an Alternative Sentencing Procedure .... provided that 'sanity'
could only be considered at sentencing."1 38 Thus, in effect, by abolish-
132. Id. at 111.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 114.
135. Id.
136. HALLECK, supra note 85, at 76. In this manner also, the prosecution receives the
conviction and the jury can have its proverbial cake and eat it too by making sure that the
defendant is properly punished, but not too harshly because of the underlying mental defect.
137. Callahan et al., supra note 15, at 332.
138. STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 121.
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ing the defense, the legislature has only permitted considerations of a
defendant's sanity in relation to the intent, or mens rea, of the crime.
What was most interesting about the results in the Montana study is
that the abolition of the defense did not stop its use by defendants. Still,
the number of insanity pleas and acquittals did lessen as a result of the
reform. 139 One change that was not accounted for as a result of the
reform was an increase in the number of women and minority (Native
American) users of the defense; yet after the reform took place, the
acquittals sharply decreased.'40 According to the authors, some of the
changes in the number of NGRI pleas may have been caused by a deter-
mination of incompetency to stand trial (IST).14 1 "People who, prior to
the reform, would have gone to the hospital for an IST and/or NGRI
evaluation and who then would have been returned to the court to stand
trial were now being civilly committed to the hospital after being found
IST with the charges dismissed."
42
As states reform their laws, percentages of NGRI pleas change for
both black and white defendants. There are, however, factors to be con-
sidered that do not appear to be racially motivated. For instance, Wash-
ington has a higher percentage of NGRI to guilty verdicts than any other
state. 143 Yet, there are obvious differences between the treatment of the
races, as evidenced by the above data and cultural studies, concerning
treatment in both the mental health and criminal justice systems.
Insanity pleas, acquittals, and prior contact with the mental health sys-
tem show a pattern of favoring white defendants. Some of the overt
manifestations of the disparity between the races may be attributable to
case law and legislation, which, although facially neutral, may have as
strong an underlying discriminatory effect as any of the discouraged
overt acts of racism.'" Empirical evidence, such as that presented
139. Id. at 125.
140. Id. at 127-28.
141. GRIsso, supra note 86, at 3. Incompetency to stand trial derives from the common law
notion that some defendants with mental inadequacies could not properly defend themselves at
trial. The incompetency to stand trial (IST) standard is based upon the Supreme Court case of
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), where it was decided that the defendant's
competency hinged upon "whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and "whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him." Id. at 402.
Incompetency is usually addressed before the criminal trial and it is accompanied by the
diagnosis of a professional forensic examiner. These determinations are presented at an
evidentiary hearing to the judge who makes the requisite finding. If the judge decides that the
defendant is incompetent to stand trial he will undergo treatment to restore his competency so that
he may be brought to trial.
142. STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 129.
143. See table supra note 96 with respect to Washington's acquittal data.
144. See Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. Rav. 317, 324-25, 381-83 (1987).
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above, may be one of the only methods to prove an overall discrimina-
tory effect on a group of people when courts and legislatures create and
interpret facially neutral policies or statutes concerning the determina-
tion of whether a defendant is to be acquitted NGRI. 14 5
F. Should the Results Be Any Different?
As evidenced by the Callahan study, some of the states have a
lower percentage of NGRI for whites than for African-Americans. This
leads to questions concerning the systems of justice in those respective
states. If the percentages of white insanity acquittees are lower than
those for black acquittees, this may mean that there is a changing, more
racially equal effect in the laws or in the administration of justice. Alter-
natively, it may mean that therapists are more willing to diagnose Afri-
can-American defendants as mentally disordered. These are difficult
issues which delve into topics which most studies do not discuss. What,
then, shows racism in the insanity defense?
This question cannot easily be answered. The data in this study
resulted in four states with lower percentages of African-American
acquittees, and four states with higher percentages of African-American
acquittees. 4 6 The researchers found that, in California and New York,
even the reforms in state laws changed neither the composition of the
defendant pools nor the success of the insanity defense itself.'47 A pat-
tern of results indicates that black defendants are less successful than the
white defendants. Does this point to racism?
It appears that, even with statistically significant evidence, it is very
difficult to "prove" racism definitively. As Charles Lawrence advises:
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in
which racism has played and still plays a dominant role. Because of
this shared experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes,
and beliefs that attach significance to an individual's race and induce
negative feelings and opinions about nonwhites .... At the same
time, most of us are unaware of our racism. We do not recognize the
ways in which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs
about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our
actions. 148
Authors and studies quoted in this section suggest that racism exists in
various aspects of diagnosis and treatment in mental health facilities.
145. Id. at 385-86.
146. See table supra note 96 demonstrating the relative percentages of successful NGRI
acquittees.
147. See supra sections C & D.
148. See Lawrence, supra note 144, at 3-4.
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Some of these aspects will be further discussed in Section III. Yet, the
paradox continues.
It is easier to claim racism or racist intent than it will ever be to
prove it. As Lawrence suggests, however, because racism is so
ingrained and so subconscious, empirical evidence and studies, such as
those above, will be the most straightforward indicator of racism. How-
ever, empirical evidence should not be the stopping point. Racism is so
pervasive that it should be examined from a sociological perspective,
accounting for aspects of behavior of diagnosticians and the justice sys-
tem itself that cannot be accounted for with raw data comparisons.
It is difficult to define which results would be more fair to African-
American defendants. Even if black defendants are found NGRI and are
transferred to a mental health facility, in many instances their treatment
may not be any better, and may last longer than if they were incarcerated
in the first instance.149 However, African-American prisoners are often
not given the mental health services which they need in prisons. 150 The
result is a cycle of inhospitable treatment, regardless of which path is
taken. Change in the case law is one area that has added to the difficulty
of proving insanity for African-American defendants, and that may
greatly influence a defendant's decision to plead insanity.
III. WHAT DOES CASE LAW DEMONSTRATE?
Even if statistics offer a reliable manner to indicate whether there
are discriminatory effects in the insanity defense, the legal system may
not be able to redress racism in the insanity defense. This section will
examine the mechanisms for seeking a remedy for race discrimination in
the insanity defense process. Before evaluating legal claims raised by
race discrimination in the insanity defense, the nature of the insanity
defense will be examined.
A. The Insanity Defense Doctrines
The insanity defense doctrine reflects the proposition that one who
lacks the requisite mental capacity to conform to society's legal require-
ments should not be held responsible for criminal acts. 15 The legal con-
cept of insanity is not the equivalent of mental illness, but actually
denotes a moral judgment about the defendant. 52 "[T]he court and the
mental health professional are faced with much the same kind of task in
insanity cases as in questions of other legal competencies: that is, assess-
149. See generally Stefan, supra note 50.
150. See infra section III.
151. GRISSO, supra note 86, at 4.
152. Id. at 156.
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ment and consideration of the person's psychological capacities." '53
The diagnosis often determines the success of the insanity plea.
Although the burden of proof in an insanity defense case varies by
state, the United States Supreme Court determined that the burden of
proof can be placed upon the defendant regardless of the standard's
stringency.1 54 However, judges often instruct the jury that although the
defendant must plead the insanity defense, the prosecution must still
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime, including
intent and deliberation. 155 These strict standards are upheld during judi-
cial proceedings and subjected to the legal standards governing the
insanity defense itself.
In his book Evaluating Competencies, 56 Thomas J. Grisso dis-
cusses the various standards of legal competency for the insanity defense
and its applications as proposed by the American Law Institute (ALI)
and the American Bar Association (ABA).157 In 1962, the ALl adopted
the following standard in its Model Penal Code, section 4.01, which a
majority of states have subsequently accepted: "A person is not respon-
sible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law.'1 58 The ALI standard does not refer to the
act as a result of the disease or mental incapacity; rather, "it requires that
'but for the disease' the incapacities would not have been in effect at the
time of the defendant's behavior."
59
In 1984, the ABA unsuccessfully proposed the eradication of the
volitional component of the ALI standard. Grisso agrees that mental
health experts cannot properly testify about defendants' volitional capac-
ities because such testimony would be on moral assumptions, not scien-
153. Id.
154. See Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976) (holding constitutional Delaware statute
requiring criminal defendant raising the insanity defense to prove mental illness by a
preponderance of the evidence); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (Oregon statute requiring
a defendant on an insanity plea to establish his defense "beyond a reasonable doubt" was
constitutional even though it was a stricter standard than that required by most state and federal
courts).
155. Leland, 343 U.S. at 794.
156. GRIsso, supra note 86, at 156.
157. There is a difference, however, between the concepts of insanity and incompetence. See,
e.g., GRIsso, supra note 86, at 159-72. Insanity is not the equivalent of mental illness, but is a
legal construct used to make ethical judgments about the defendant who is mentally ill.
Incompetence is a judgment about the status of an individual, whether that individual is or can
become a danger to him or herself or to society.
158. Id. at 159.
159. Id. at 160.
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tific principles. 60  The ABA's proposed standard narrows the
psychologist's testimony to purely observable behaviors measured by
diagnostic tests based upon a normative scale of behavior, that, as dis-
cussed earlier, disfavors African-Americans. This paradox surfaces
from the requirement of a "behavioral standard" conforming to white
behavior. If therapists are biased and less culturally sensitive, imposing
a standard will not help to meet the goals of the culturally sensitive
therapist. However, eradication of a standard would make the adminis-
tration of justice more difficult. What is the proper standard? There is
no easy answer.
According to Martin and Grubb:
There exists the danger of a White therapist dismissing evidence of
psychological disturbance as merely reflecting the subculture of the
Black patient .... [S]ymptoms and behaviors such as hallucinating,
extreme grandiosity, or even ingestion of sharp objects by Black chil-
dren have been seen as culturally appropriate or manipulative by mis-
guided or racially biased therapists.' 6'
Empirical evidence also suggests that the cultural heritage of the thera-
pist influences diagnosis, and diagnoses from therapists of similar
cultural backgrounds may vary greatly. 62  The therapist's moral
assumptions are cloaked in bias. Although this is outwardly unaccept-
able, the bias inherent in our racist society cannot be eliminated. 63 Sec-
tion IV, however, discusses some possibilities for effectuating more
racially-balanced treatment.
B. Constitutional Claims
A great deal of litigation has involved racism under the facially
neutral guise of the criminal justice system, but none specifically regard-
ing race in the strictures of the insanity defense outside of Sixth Amend-
ment claims of improper assistance of counsel. Examining racism
litigation in the areas of the death penalty, and habitual offender statutes
in particular, will expose a useful method of analyzing issues of racism
in the insanity defense.
The United States Supreme Court made clear, in Furman v. Geor-
gia,' 64 that black defendants received the death penalty more often than
whites, and declared unconstitutional all death penalty statutes existing
at the time. Since that time, "[n]otwithstanding the implementation of
160. Id. at 161.
161. Martin & Grubb, supra note 9, at 262.
162. Id. at 261.
163. Lawrence, supra note 144, at 388.
164. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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procedural safeguards in the past two decades to eliminate discrimina-
tion in death penalty sentencing, it vehemently continues to exist
today." 165 It persists in subtle forms of discrimination because "the judi-
ciary and the prosecution generally do not make overt racist attempts (in
death penalty sentencing).' 1 66 Consequently, covert racism results.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 167 decided in 1987, was the Supreme Court's
answer to a claim of racism in the capital punishment context. McCles-
key, a black man convicted of killing a white victim, appealed a death
sentence under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and attempted
to use statistical evidence (the Baldus study) to show the racially dis-
criminatory application of Georgia's death penalty. 168 The Court deter-
mined that McCleskey's attempt to use the study was not proper
evidence of an Equal Protection Clause violation under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 169 or of a violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment. ' 70 According to the Court, the Baldus
study would, at most, indicate a discrepancy that appeared to correlate
with race,' 7' since it did not demonstrate that Georgia's capital punish-
ment laws violated due process.
The Court determined that the Baldus study failed to prove that
Georgia violated the Equal Protection Clause in passing and allowing a
capital punishment statute to stay in effect in the face of discriminatory
application.' 72 To show bias, McCleskey had to "prove that the deci-
sionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose." 173 To sup-
port this claim, McCleskey had to demonstrate that the legislature
enacted the capital punishment statute or continued its application for an
anticipated discriminatory result.1
74
The Court also held that the Baldus study failed to show that Geor-
gia's capital punishment system violated the Eighth Amendment's pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 175 Because states had a
great deal of discretion in the realm of capital punishment, McCleskey
165. Stan R. Gregory, Capital Punishment and Equal Protection: Constitutional Problems,
Race and the Death Penalty, 5 ST. THOMAS U. L. Rav. 257, 258 (1992).
166. Id. at 262.
167. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
168. Specifically, the study was based on the results of over 2,000 murder cases in Georgia in
the 1970s. The study examined the effects of the race of the victim and of the defendant and
concluded that black defendants who killed white victims were most likely to receive the death
penalty.
169. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291-92.
170. Id. at 308-09.
171. Id. at 312.
172. Id. at 298.
173. Id. at 292.
174. Id. at 298.
175. Id. at 308-09.
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would have to have shown that the Georgia system "operates in an arbi-
trary and capricious manner." 176 The Court found that there was no
indiscriminate sentencing decision in this case by the jury.1
7 7
A great concern for the Court was its belief that McCleskey's claim
would undermine the criminal justice system's foundational principles if
the alleged inherent discrimination in the sentencing system could be
shown by statistical evidence. 178 Ironically, the Court has permitted sta-
tistical evidence to show discrimination in "certain limited contexts,"' 7 9
such as Title VII cases under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and in jury
selection cases under the justification of express statutory assent. Yet, it
was not permitted in capital punishment cases. 80
C. The Intent Requirement
Another instance of discriminatory treatment in the context of the
criminal justice system is the application of the habitual offender stat-
utes. 18' Data gathered by the Palm Beach County Office of the Public
Defender 182 supports the racially discriminatory impact concerning the
application of the Florida Habitual Offender statutes.
8 3
176. Id. at 306.
177. Id. at 306-07.
178. Id. at 314.
179. Id. at 293.
180. Id. at 293-94.
181. Florida Statutes § 775.084(l)(a) defines habitual felony offender as:
a defendant for whom the court may impose an extended term of imprisonment if it
finds that:
(1) The defendant has previously been convicted of any combination of two or
more felonies in this state or other qualified offenses;
(2) The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed within 5
years of the date of the conviction of the last prior felony or other qualified offense
of which he was convicted, or within 5 years of the defendant's release, on parole or
otherwise, from a prison sentence or other commitment imposed as a result of a
prior conviction for a felony or other qualified offense, whichever is later;
(3) The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced, and one of the two prior
felony convictions, is not a violation of s.893.13 relating to the purchase or the
possession of a controlled substance;
(4) The defendant has not received a pardon for any felony or other qualified
offense that is necessary for the operation of this section; and
(5) A conviction of a felony or other qualified offense necessary to the operation of
this section has not been set aside in any postconviction proceeding.
FLA. STAT. § 775.084(l)(a).
182. The Palm Beach County Public Defender's Office lies in Florida's Fifteenth Judicial
Circuit.
183. Amicus Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union at 2, Florida v. Robinson (No. 91-
10456 CF A 02 "V") (on file with the author).
[T]he average racial composition of all felony divisions at the time the Habitual
Offender Court was created was: 42% white, 55% black, and 3% hispanic. From
May 14, 1991 to August 30, 1991, the defendants assigned to the Habitual Offender
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Based upon this data, case law precedent and various empirical
studies, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed an amicus
brief in the Florida Circuit Court case of State v. Robinson,8" seeking to
have the Florida Habitual Offender Court declared unconstitutional."8 5
The ACLU claimed that "[t]he administrative order creating the Habit-
ual Felony Offender Division violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Florida Constitution because it has a discriminatory effect on black
defendants."'
8 6
The difficulty in demonstrating actual incidents of discrimination is
that "[a]bsent exceedingly rare instances of racist remarks by prosecu-
tors or of formal policies that visibly target minorities for harsher treat-
ment, virtually the only method of documenting actual racial
discrimination is through empirical studies that statistically demonstrate
the disparate treatment of minority defendants."'8 7 The ACLU argues
that assignments to the Habitual Offender Division are racially moti-
vated and should be subject to strict guidelines and procedures for trans-
fer rather than a vague "good faith" requirement.188
According to the ACLU, all that is required from the prosecuting
attorney in deciding whether to transfer a case to the Habitual Offender
Division of the Circuit Court is a "good faith belief" that the defendant
meets the criteria of Administrative Order 3.208-5/91.189 The habitual
offender penalties are much more severe than normal prosecution, 190 and
under this "good faith" standard a defendant has no hard and fast rule to
Court were 25.8% white, 71.6% black, and 2.6% hispanic. These numbers show
that blacks were overrepresented in Habitual Offender Court and that the
overrepresentation is increasing. Between May 14, 1991 and November 21, 1991,
the racial disparity increased. In that time frame defendants in the Habitual
Offender court were 18.5% white, 77.9% black, and 3.6% hispanic.
Id.
184. This case was filed in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in Palm Beach County, Florida,
Criminal Division, Case Number 91-10456 CF A 02 "V".
185. Amicus Brief, supra note 183, at 11-14.
186. Id. at 3.
187. Id. at 9.
188. See id. at 5, 11-13.
189. Id. at 5.
190. FLA. STAT. § 775.084(4)(a) provides that if a defendant becomes a habitual offender by
committing a specified number of offenses:
The court, in conformity with the procedure established in subsection (3) [the court
must determine in a separate proceeding if the defendant is a habitual felony
offender], shall sentence the habitual felony offender as follows:
1. In the case of a felony of the first degree, for life.
2. In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term of years not
exceeding 30.
3. In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term of years not
exceeding 10.
FLA. STAT. § 775.084(4)(a).
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rely on to determine whether his case will be transferred. However, as
the ACLU argues, a presumption of a violation by overassignment of
African-Americans to the Habitual Offender Division' 9 would then
shift the burden of proof to the prosecution, thereby leaving the prosecu-
tion the daunting task of refuting the presumption of racism.
1 92
As discussed in the above examples, the court requires the defend-
ant to show an "intent to discriminate."'' 93 Proving the intent to discrim-
inate against a defendant is an almost impossible burden for the
defendant to shoulder, because the only conceivable manner to prove
this intent is through overtly discriminatory remarks by the prosecution,
judge or legislature.' 94 Granted, to try a defendant as a habitual offender
does not require expert testimony by a mental health professional. The
insanity defendant, however, has to fight two layers of discrimination-
that of the mental health professional, and that of the court system.
Although racial discrimination in the insanity defense has not been
litigated, the insanity defense would surely fit into this "overwhelming
burden of proof" category, because it too rests upon the unbiased deci-
sionmaking of the court system. An additional layer to the burden of
proving discrimination against a particular insanity defendant on behalf
of the decisionmakers surfaces in the guise of the "neutral expert" who
must testify to the mental condition of the defendant. The question is:
Can there be a truly neutral expert? "[M]ental health experts have been
criticized for offering testimony that may be intentionally or unintention-
ally biased. Biased testimony can be defined as issuing opinions, rec-
ommendations, or conclusions that are colored or distorted as a result of
personal, theoretical, or overtly extraneous situational or individual
factors."'
9 5
Michael Perlin, in his article Pretexts and Mental Disability Law:
The Case of Competency, 96 explores and suggests some of the ines-
191. Amicus Brief, supra note 183, at 13. This presumption would arise by way of a
demonstration of statistical evidence showing that blacks rather than whites were more often
assigned to the Habitual Offender Division. Id. at 11-12.
192. Id. at 13-14.
193. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-93 (1987); see also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (holding that minority members of city's police force had to
show intentional discrimination in challenging employment policies); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (finding that evidence did not
support discriminatory intent, even where racial motives were present); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976) (failing to find discrimination against African-American candidates for police
force, although results of civil service test, used as an indication of success on the force, showed
that African-Americans failed at a rate of four times greater than for whites).
194. See Lawrence, supra note 144, at 317.
195. Jean C. Beckham et al., Decision Making and Examiner Bias in Forensic Expert
Recommendations for Not Guilty by Reason ofInsanity, 13 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 79, 80 (1989).
196. Perlin, supra note 33.
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capable sources of bias in forensic expert testimony. "In a whole range
of forensic mental health fact settings, social bias 'infects and hides
behind scientific judgments ..... Other evidence suggests that variables
such as race, sex, culture, gender preference, physical attractiveness and
economic status significantly affect expert testimony." 197 Perlin advises
that the social conceptions of the expert, and the therapist's frequent
misunderstanding of standards and legal tests by which to diagnose the
patient, have important effects upon the conclusions of these experts. 198
According to Perlin, therapists may feel the need to find pathology
to show that they have the ability to find it, or that their training may
influence what diagnostic skills and tests will be utilized for patient
evaluations. 199 "Most importantly, this tableau seemingly has arisen
with little or no awareness on the part of the forensic experts them-
selves."200 These concepts imply significant ramifications when consid-
ering that legal decisionmakers, such as judges, often defer to the
testimony of those mental health professionals. 20 1 "The image that pro-
fessionals do not impose their own values on their clients and that they
have no goals beyond advancing the client's interest is the source of
much of their power and a principal reason that professional pronounce-
ments are taken as persuasive. "202
Unfortunately, if it is true that professionals' decisions and diagno-
ses are based upon normative values, and judges rely upon these deci-
sions, personal bias of the decisionmakers in the courtroom is
unescapable. Furthermore, no easy manner to prove these biases exists;
nonetheless, it is important to recognize their existence. As Charles
Lawrence discusses in his article The Id, The Ego and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,23 even though society does not
outwardly accept racism, society is inherently racist.2°4 This juxtaposi-
tion of values, thus, causes racist feelings to go underground and mani-
fest in covert racism.
20 5
With respect to case law, "in the absence of proof of an intent to
segregate, the Court will simply defer to the judgment of the govern-
197. Id. at 641-43.
198. Id. at 643.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Stefan, supra note 50, at 24.
202. Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts": From Deference to Abdication
Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 655 (1992).
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mental decision-maker. 20 6 These kinds of covert racist decisions are
exemplified in cases involving discrimination in civil service exams.
Two cases decided within six years of each other determined that civil
service exams, although demonstrating a racially disparate impact, were
not discriminatory because the plaintiff did not prove an intent to
discriminate.207
In Washington v. Davis,208 two African-American applicants for the
Metropolitan Police force in Washington, D.C. alleged that hiring prac-
tices were discriminatory. They cited a civil service examination called
Test 21, that blacks failed at a proportionately higher rate than whites,
claiming that the test was discriminatory in that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.20 9 The Court noted, "our
cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act,
without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is
unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate
impact."210 Purposeful discrimination must be shown to prevail on a
discrimination claim. However, the discrimination need not be express.
The Court upheld the opinion of the district court in this case, finding
that the supplemental efforts of the police department to recruit minori-
ties was sufficient to dispel any question of discrimination and finding
that Test 21 was proper because it directly related to preparation for
duty.2
11
The second case, Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commis-
sion of the City of New York,212 involved both African-American and
Hispanic members of the City of New York Police Department who
challenged the City's "last-hired, first-fired" policy which provided that
those with the lowest civil service test scores would be hired last and
fired first. African-Americans and Hispanics tended to have the lowest
test scores and were, therefore, subject to the penalties of the department
policy, including lower pay and fewer benefits. 213 The minority mem-
bers claimed that their rights under Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 had been violated.
The issue as designated by the Court concerned "whether the pri-
vate plaintiffs in this case need to prove discriminatory intent to estab-
206. William E. Boyd, Purpose and Effect in the Law of Race Discrimination: A Response to
Washington v. Davis, 57 U. DET. J. URn. L. 707, 708.
207. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976).
208. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
209. Id. at 232-33.
210. Id. at 239.
211. Id. at 250.
212. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
213. Id. at 585.
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lish a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000 d... and administrative implementing regulations promulgated
thereunder. '21 4 First, the Court recognized that Title VI, when viewed
through Davis, does not prohibit unintentional race discrimination.215
The Court then explored case precedent and legislative intent, citing Lau
v. Nichols 21 6 as the authority for the proposition that a discriminatory
effect, if demonstrated, may prove a violation of Title VI in a private
action, as in this case, and thereby rejected the contention that actual
discriminatory intent must be shown.217 The remedy that could be
granted for a showing of disparate impact under Title VI regulations,
however, would not allow the claimants monetary damages for their
claims. At most, they would be entitled to a form of injunctive relief.
218
What is interesting about the opinion is the Court's acceptance of
discriminatory impact in the form of an affirmative defense for a "busi-
ness necessity." '219 It also continues that, if there is not intentional dis-
crimination demonstrated, a defense may be presented that the agency
was not aware of this impact.220 Almost in direct opposition to this
defense is the Congressional intent quoted by the Court: "Title VI rests
on the principle that taxpayers' money, which is collected without dis-
crimination, shall be spent without discrimination."22' Reconciling this
with the intent requirement for receipt of monetary damages, the Court
concludes that prospective relief will only be granted by allowing the
officers input into future exams, leaving their past complaints unreach-
able in the absence of proof of intentional discrimination.222
Over ten years later these suits continue to arise. A complaint filed
recently in the Dade County Circuit Court by twenty-nine police officers
of different races alleged discrimination via the oral portion of the
officer promotion examination.223 Although the officers were of mixed
races, many complaints came from African-American officers whose
videotaped oral examination was extremely unflattering. One officer's
tape was shot so poorly, all that was visible was "her gold eye glasses
214. Id. at 584 & n.l (quoting Title VI, or 42 U.S.C. § 2000d: "No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.").
215. Id. at 589-90 (discussing Davis).
216. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
217. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 587.
218. Id. at 597.
219. Id. at 598.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 599.
222. Id. at 607.
223. Noreen Marcus, Officers: Sergeants' Exam Unfair, MiAMi DAILY Bus. REV., Mar. 15,
1995, at Al.
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and her white teeth."224 The attorney for the officers claimed that pro-
motions were so arbitrary that one plaintiff, after completing the oral
portion of the examination went from second place after the written
exam to 116th place after the oral exam.225
Unfortunately, it appears that there will never be a clear solution to
the claims of discrimination, unless the legal system can confront its
own biases in cases of disparate impact. This is because courts have
steadfastly adhered to the discriminatory intent test for claims of dis-
criminatory sentencing or discriminatory application of statutes. How-
ever, if the defendant could use such studies to create a presumption of
discriminatory intent, and the prosecution were given the opportunity to
rebut this presumption, the burden of proof would be placed on the
proper party, the party in a position to discriminate.
Charles Lawrence advises the proper question to ask when con-
fronting a racially disproportionate effect of legislation or lawmaking is:
"Have societal attitudes about race influenced the governmental actor's
decision? ' 226 He argues that racism is not a conscious process, but is an
ingrained cultural response to those different from us, and that as society
rejects racism, racial motives burrow further underground, and cannot be
brought to light with speculation about those motives.227 He emphasizes
that it is that much more difficult to determine responsibility when there
is more than one decisionmaker.228 How is it possible to determine
which of the parties is responsible for the discriminatory intent? There-
fore, a discriminatory intent test does not fit within the cultural regime.
Lawrence proposes a "cultural meaning test" in which the court
would evaluate government conduct based upon the historical and social
context of decisionmaking. 229 This approach would examine legislative
history with the understanding of the times in order to understand the
motives of the decisionmakers. Lawrence advises that often social sci-
ence is consulted in court decisions for general premises, such as school
desegregation, because it describes culture, but not for hard, scientific
evidence.2 30 The cultural meaning test could be used in conjunction
with the presentation of empirical data to demonstrate the cultural
effects upon the outcome of pleas of NGRI.
As an alternative to claims of discrimination that are often impossi-
ble to prove, defendants bring claims of violation of the Sixth Amend-
224. Id. at A6.
225. Id.
226. Lawrence, supra note 144, at 328.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 319.
229. Id. at 357.
230. Id. at 360.
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ment right to effective representation by counsel.23 1 As many black
defendants are poor, their cases are taken by public defenders who have
neither the time nor the concern to pursue a full-scale insanity
defense.2 32 The deference given to defense counsel and to the court in
sentencing is an essential underpinning of the criminal justice system in
the United States, and yet it raises a number of issues. "With poor cli-
ents, lawyers seek a speedy and uncomplicated disposition of the case.
Plea bargaining is the preferred method of closure since it is more expe-
dient than a trial, whether or not there is a question about the person's
guilt or innocence. '"233
According to one study:
Information from the State of California suggests that trial cases
involving the insanity plea can be complicated and, perhaps, are
worth avoiding if possible. In 1986, it took an average of 289 days to
process a defendant from arrest to an NGRI disposition .... The
average elapsed time for the various other dispositions ranged from
117 days to 230 days.234
The insanity plea in these cases may operate to limit the punishment that
would normally befall a criminal defendant. This may not be a poor
tactical decision, but it may backfire at the end in an adjudication of
insanity that would keep the defendant incarcerated for a longer period
of time. This rarely occurs, however, because the insanity plea itself is
infrequent.
Representation by public defenders demonstrates another important
reason for the lack of utilization of the insanity defense by the black
defendant: "[T]he extent to which.., blacks who might have been...
mentally disordered and were channeled into prison rather than appro-
231. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.
(emphasis added). Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), advises that to establish an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the attorney must have performed deficiently and preju-
dice must have resulted from that performance. See Alvord v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 956 (1984)
(holding that where defendant had been acquitted on a prior insanity defense, defense attorney has
responsibility not only to accept the plea decided upon by client, but also to conduct a thorough
investigation to determine whether that plea, or a plea of insanity, would be in defendant's best
interest); Clark v. Collins, 19 F.3d 959 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that reports by psychiatrist show-
ing no mental defect does not require defense counsel to investigate further and that failure to
inquire on voir dire about racial bias does not satisfy both prongs of Strickland).
232. OWENS, supra note 6, at 78.
233. Id. at 25.
234. McGinley & Pasewark, supra note 68, at 220.
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priate mental health facilities because those institutions were not puni-
tive enough will never be known. ' 235 In actuality, black defendants will
spend more time incarcerated if they are diverted to mental health facili-
ties. As a result, many attorneys persuade their clients to plea bargain in
the criminal justice system, regardless of their mental status.236 Public
defenders, therefore, must balance considerations of limited time and
resources against the client's wish to spend the least amount of time
incarcerated. Thus, African-American defendants wishing to assert the
insanity defense must convince not only mental health professionals and
juries that their violent behavior was the result of a mental imbalance,
but in many instances, they must convince their own attornies.
Often Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
fail for the same reason that other claims of disparate impact fail,
because of the required demonstration of intentional discrimination. The
primary question remains: As it is difficult to satisfy the discriminatory
intent standard, is there another means of diminishing the racially dispa-
rate impact, perhaps through programs designed for this purpose in the
criminal justice and mental health systems? This issue is examined in
Section IV.
IV. WHAT CHANGES CAN BE MADE?
One important change that could be implemented in the criminal
justice system, as previously discussed, is to permit empirical evidence
showing disparate impact to create a presumption of discrimination and
shift the burden of proof to the prosecution. The courts have summarily
rejected this approach, and there appears to be no easy solution to
change the intentional discrimination requirement.
Although there is no immediate solution to the biases existing in
the criminal justice and mental health systems, some find long-term
planning appears to be helpful. Programs may have to take a "trickle-
up" approach, that is, begin with the entry levels of both systems and
work upward to the judges and administrators. Suggestions for these
bottom-up systems have been widespread, and are possibly easier to
implement than it would be to change a social structure that has existed
for many years under a covert system of discriminatory practices.
This "trickle-up" theory for early intervention has its place in facili-
ties such as prison systems. A study of the New York State prison sys-
tem,2 37 found that significantly more white, as compared to black
235. OWENS, supra note 6, at 27-28.
236. Id. at 79.
237. Henry Steadman et al., Estimating Mental Health Needs and Service Utilization Among
Prison Inmates, 19 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 297, 297 (1991).
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inmates, received mental health services. The purpose of the study was
to examine the "prevalence of psychiatric and functional disability and
service utilization." '238 The subjects were a randomly selected group of
3,684 inmates from the prison system sampled in May 1986.239 The
study group was 51.7% black and 21.6% white, which, the authors
noted, was similar to the actual prison population.24 °
Comparing the two groups, 11.3% of black inmates had received
mental health services within 30 days of the study and 19.4% received
services within the past year. White inmates fared better; 20.1%
received services within 30 days of the study and 29.0% within the pre-
vious year.2 4' Moreover, the prison population had severe mental disa-
bilities. Further, 45-56% of that group did not receive any mental health
services and were nonwhite males.242  Although African-Americans
comprised a larger percentage of the prison population, they did not
have equal access to mental health services. This was recognized as one
of the problems of the system.2 43 Since the date of the study, New York
implemented various programs in an attempt to equalize some of the
racial inequities inherent in its system. Many psychologists have also
proposed programs to attain these goals.
For instance, Dr. Linda Teplin has some suggestions for changing
the first contact many have in the criminal justice system, the confronta-
tion and arrest of the defendant by police officers. 2 " She advises that
police officers often play the part of the "streetcorner psychiatrist.
2 45
This is where the analysis begins, because without the arrest the defend-
ant would not take part in the criminal justice system regardless of his or
her mental state. According to Dr. Teplin, an improper arrest of a men-
tally ill individual stems from one of two sources, either an improper
connection between the police and the mental health system or from the
mental health system's failures.2 46 Often, an officer will attempt to
bring a person into a mental health facility only to have him or her
238. Id. at 297.
239. Id. The authors indicate that random analyses allow the determination of the factors
actually associated with the receipt of mental health services. They point to "demographic,
.criminal history, and type of disability" as some of those factors. Id. at 298.
240. Id. at 299. Hispanics comprised 25% and 1.7% were classified as "other." These
percentages echoed closely those of the actual prison population: 50.3% black, 21.8% white,
27.3% Hispanic and 0.6% as other. Id.
241. Id. at 302.
242. Id. at 305.
243. Id.
244. Linda A. Teplin, Policing the Mentally IIl: Styles, Strategies, and Implications, in
MENTAL ILLNESS IN AMERICA'S PRISONS 10 (Henry J. Steadman ed., 1990).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 14.
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rejected.247 After exhausting the available alternatives, the officer often
is forced to make an arrest to keep the person off the streets one more
day until he or she can be brought to court and released. 248 The time
between arrest and trial seems to be a waiting period for the mentally ill
offender, but there is not a great deal of literature covering this waiting
period.
Dr. Teplin recommends that police officers should be trained in
managing the mentally ill and have support from the mental health sys-
tem. She also suggests that police officers should be rewarded for
proper and prudent management of mentally ill arrestees. 249 If this were
achieved, those taken into police custody would have a better opportu-
nity to receive the treatment they need, rather than being shuffled
through the criminal justice system in a manner that they could not com-
prehend. Cases such as Guardians Association, in effect, defeat these
purposes where the court finds that its power does not reach uninten-
tional discriminatory effects.25° If multicultural police officers are kept
off the force or not permitted to advance, there will certainly be a dearth
of culturally understanding parties to assist those who encounter the
criminal justice system, whether they have a mental deficiency or not.
In their article, Using Intensive Case Management to Reduce Vio-
lence by Mentally Ill Persons in the Community,25" Joel Dvoskin and
Henry Steadman set forth an important diagnosis of the criminal justice
and mental health systems.
Traditional mental health programs are staffed by credentialed
247. Id. at 13. Dr. Teplin describes four situations in which this occurs: when the person is
not disturbed enough to be accepted by a hospital, but cannot be ignored because of his egregious
behaviors; when the hospital is concerned that the person may become a problem for the facility
staff or its patients; when the person is too dangerous to be treated; or when the person has
multiple problems.
248. The chapter presents a vignette of a large black man named Charlie, taken from a bus
while intoxicated, who was ushered to a hospital by police and was refused admittance because
the staff feared that he may be a problem for them. At that point the officers requested that the
hospital sign a complaint so that Charlie could be arrested for disorderly conduct. The hospital
obliged, although Charlie did nothing which would cause his arrest. Id. at 14. This is a rather
disturbing observation because "[t]he police officer's decision to make an emergency psychiatric
apprehension, arrest or manage a mentally ill person by informal means is based less on the degree
of psychiatric symptomatology than on the socio-psychological and structural factors pertinent to
each situation." Id. at 16.
The reason thaf this is such an uncomfortable observation is that Charlie's "arrest" was based
upon the fact tha" he was a large black man who "looked dangerous," yet his only wrongdoing
was intoxication.
249. Id. at 26-27.
250. See cases cited supra note 193.
251. Joel A. Dvoskin & Henry J. Steadman, Using Intensive Case Management to Reduce
Violence by Mentally Ill Persons in the Community, 45 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 679,
679 (1994).
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mental health professionals who are typically white and middle-class.
However, clients who are likely to be arrested do not share this dem-
ographic profile and may have opted not to use traditional mental
health services because they feel disenfranchised .... To increase
the relevance of case management services to these clients, mental
health systems should try to employ case managers who are culturally
similar to the clients they serve. [C]ultural similarity may be more
important than an advanced degree in one of the mental health pro-
fessions in preparation to serve high-risk clients.252
As previously discussed, to present a successful insanity defense, it
is important for black defendants to have had prior access to the mental
health system.253 Unfortunately, this has not been the case for the
majority of black defendants.
In a 1989 article, Dvoskin and Steadman determined that a popula-
tion of African-American inmates were significantly underserved in
treatment; they therefore began an active recruiting plan for minority
clinicians. 254 The minority clinician aspect of the program is especially
attractive because it allows the client to feel that he is in touch with the
person who is handling his case. Examples of black patient/white thera-
pist illustrate that there is a cultural gap that cannot be bridged when the
patient feels disenfranchised from a system that is designed to help him.
The Seventh Circuit case of Wellman v. Faulkner255 makes an
important point that " 'a language barrier between the inmate and the
physician' .. . could interfere with the quality and effectiveness of medi-
cal care [and] can readily lead to misdiagnoses and therefore pain and
suffering. '256 This metaphor can carry over into the mental health sys-
tem: If the patient and the psychologist do not speak the same cultural
language, this may also result in misdiagnoses and similar pain and suf-
fering. With recruitment of minority clinicians, perhaps some of these
misunderstandings can be diffused at an earlier stage.
New York State appears to be taking steps toward some of the
changes that would "re-enfranchise" African-American defendants in
need of mental health care after entering the prison system. 7 For
instance, the Intermediate Care Programs (ICP) provide mental health
services to inmates who do not require the intensive inpatient services
and at the same time need more help than outpatient services offer.
252. Id. at 683.
253. See, e.g., table supra note 84.
254. Joel A. Dvoskin & Henry J. Steadman, Chronically Mentally 1ll Inmates: The Wrong
Concept for the Right Services, 12 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 203, 207 (1989).
255. 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983).
256. Id. at 272.
257. Ward S. Condelli et al., Intermediate Care Programs for Inmates with Psychiatric
Disorders, 22 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 63 (1994).
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"This makes it possible to create a therapeutic community in which
mentally ill inmates are sheltered from being taunted, exploited, or
assaulted by predatory inmates in the general prison population."
25
Data collected demonstrated that of the total number of 209 inmates in
the program, 115 (55%) were black and 58 (28%) were white.2 59 This
more closely echoes the actual prison population in the state. The *study
determined that of the "inmates who stayed in [this] program for six or
more months, significant reductions were found in very serious rules
infraction and suicide attempts, correctional discipline, and three mental
health services: crisis care, seclusion, and hospitalization. ' 260 The ICP
program allowed inmates to re-enculturate themselves into the general
prison population.
A final problem arises when the mentally ill offenders have termi-
nated their sentences and will have the opportunity to return to the com-
munity. "The large majority of inmates identified in the jail as mentally
ill appear to be discharged with no formal discharge plan or arrange-
ments for community mental health services. '261  Eliot Hartstone sug-
gests that upon release, it is vital that mentally ill individuals receive the
treatment they need. This can be accomplished by combining the jail
and community services to provide care for those who need it.262 The
importance of these services is their effect on preventing arrests and vio-
lent acts from happening repeatedly. To accomplish this the services
must be racially responsive. If that goal can be accomplished, even for a
small number of offenders, it will make communities safer and alleviate
some of the pressures on the prison systems to release their prisoners
quickly, although no provisions existed for their care.
V. CONCLUSION
According to Joel Dvoskin, "judgments about groups of people can
only lead to stigma and discrimination, while judgments about individu-
als if based on reason and information, can lead to better treatment
outcomes and increased safety for the individuals and their communi-
ties." '63 This is the attitude that the criminal justice and mental health
systems must adopt to provide due process and fair treatment for all that
come before them. Racial discrimination is a very pervasive subject and
258. Id. at 64.
259. Id. at 66.
260. Id. at 69.
261. Eliot Hartstone, The Mentally Ill and the Local Jail: Policy and Action, in MENTAL
ILLNESS IN AMERICA'S PRISONS, supra note 244, at 108.
262. Id.
263. Joel A. Dvoskin, What Are the Odds on Predicting Violent Behavior, 2 J. CAL. ALLIANCE
FOR MENTALLY ILL 6 (1990).
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often taboo in certain situations; yet, it does exist. Although discrimina-
tion cannot be proven outright in every situation, it is extremely impor-
tant that professionals in both the legal and mental health professions be
aware of discrimination, and make their decisions on conscious, rea-
soned information so as not to fall victim to unconscious racism.264
African-Americans have been found to be overrepresented in involun-
tary commitment, the death penalty, and discriminatory sentencing and
underrepresented in the opportunity to be rehabilitated in the manner
which would be most suitable to their treatment and eventual return to
society. If the criminal justice and mental health systems would work
together to put aside the prejudices that infiltrate their innerworkings,
those who require treatment would have the opportunity to become more
equal to those who received the treatment they needed.
HAVA B. VILLAVERDE*
264. Lawrence, supra note 144, at 317.
* The author would like to thank Susan Stefan for all of her insight and guidance in writing
this article; Dr. Joel Dvoskin for all of his assistance with the research resources; Dr. Henry
Steadman and Eric Silver for the plea data and interpretations, and most of all, her husband Albi,
without whose support and understanding neither this article nor law school would be possible.
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